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We estimate the pricing of sovereign risk for sixty countries based on fiscal space (debt/tax; deficits/tax)
and other economic fundamentals over 2005-10. We measure how accurately the model predicts sovereign
credit default swap (CDS) spreads, focusing in particular on the five countries in the South-West Eurozone
Periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).  Dynamic panel estimates of the model suggest
that fiscal space and other macroeconomic factors are statistically significant and economically important
determinants of market-based sovereign risk. Although the explanatory power of fiscal space measures
drop during the crisis, the TED spread, trade openness, external debt and inflation play a larger role.
As expectations of market volatility jumped during the crisis, the weakly concavity of creditors’ payoff
probably accounts for the emergence of TED spread as a key pricing factor. However, risk-pricing
of the South-West Eurozone Periphery countries is not predicted accurately by the model either in-sample
or out-of-sample: unpredicted high spreads are evident during global crisis period, especially in 2010
when the sovereign debt crisis swept over the periphery area. We “match” the periphery group with
five middle income countries outside Europe that were closest in terms of fiscal space during the European
fiscal crisis. We find that Eurozone periphery default risk is priced much higher than the “matched”
countries in 2010, even allowing for differences in fundamentals. One interpretation is that the market
has mispriced risk in the Eurozone periphery. An alternative interpretation is that the market is pricing
not on current fundamentals but future fundamentals, expecting the periphery fiscal space to deteriorate
markedly and posing a high risk of debt restructuring. Adjustment challenges of the Eurozone periphery
may be perceived as economically and politically more difficult than the matched group of middle
income countries because of exchange rate and monetary constraints.
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1.  Introduction    
During 2000 to 2006, the OECD and most emerging markets experienced a 
remarkable decline in macroeconomic volatility and the price of risk.  This period turned 
out to be the tail-end of the Great Moderation, a precursor of the turbulences leading to 
the global financial crisis of 2008-09, the consequent increase in risk premia, and the 
focus on fiscal challenges and the importance of fiscal space in navigating future 
economic challenges. The latter stages of the crisis, unfolding in 2010, focused attention 
on the heterogeneity of the Euro block, and the unique challenges facing the five South-
West Eurozone Periphery countries, or SWEAP group (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain), in adjusting to fiscal fragility in the context of a ten-year old currency union.
1   
This paper investigates the pricing of risk associated with the sovereign debt crisis 
that escalated during 2010 in several European countries.  Our objective is to determine 
whether the perception of relatively high sovereign default risk of the fiscally distressed 
Euro area countries, as seen in market pricing of credit default swap (CDS) spreads, may 
be explained by existing past or current fundamentals of debt and deficits relative to tax 
revenues – which we term de facto fiscal space – and other economic determinants.
2  Our 
analysis allows us to address several questions. Does fiscal space help systematically 
explain the evolution of the market pricing of risk beyond that embedded in other 
macroeconomic indicators? Was risk in some markets (e.g. SWEAP) “overpriced” in 
																																																								
1 The SWEAP acronym for these five countries is used in Buiter and Rahbari (2010).  
2Our measure of fiscal space is from Aizenman and Jinjarak (2010).  They propose a 
stock and flow measure of de facto fiscal space.  The stock variable is defined as the 
inverse of the tax-years it would take to repay the public debt. In this paper, fiscal space 
is measured both as outstanding government debt and government deficits, relative to the 
de facto tax base. The deficits measure is the realized tax collection, averaged across 
several years to smooth for business cycle fluctuations.    3
2010  judging by model predictions using the prevailing values of fiscal space other 
macro variables?  
Our objectives for the empirical work are three-fold.  Firstly, we determine 
whether CDS spreads (in a panel regression setting) are related to fiscal space measures 
and other economic determinants. Secondly, we address whether there is an identifiable 
dynamic pattern to CDS spreads during the crisis period.  Thirdly, we investigate pricing 
differentials of CDS spreads in the Euro area, and the SWEAP in particular, compared to 
other countries. We seek to answer the question of whether Euro area and SWEAP CDS 
spreads follow the same pattern as the rest of the world or may they considered 
“mispriced” in some sense, especially during the 2010 European debt crisis.    
To this end, we develop a pricing model of sovereign risk for a large number of 
countries (60) within and outside of Europe, before and after the global financial crisis, 
based on fiscal space and other economic fundamentals including the foreign interest 
rate, external debt, trade openness, nominal depreciation, inflation, GDP/Capita and 
economic growth. We use this dynamic panel model to explain CDS spreads and 
determine whether the market pricing of risk is comparable in the affected European 
countries and elsewhere in the world.  By this methodology, and using in-sample and out-
of-sample predictions, we can determine whether there are systematically large prediction 
errors for the CDS spreads during the global financial crisis and in 2010 when the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe intensified.  Systematically large prediction errors may be 
due to mispricing of risk or may be attributable to expectations of a future decline in 
fundamentals that lead to higher default risk. We also “match,” on the basis of similar 
fiscal space, each SWEAP country with a corresponding Middle Income country. This   4
provides additional information on the market pricing of risk between SWEAP and 
countries with similar fiscal conditions but, unlike SWEAP, with histories of debt 
restructuring.  
Our investigation reveals a complex and time-varying environment in the market 
for sovereign default risk. Specifically, we find empirically a key role of fiscal space in 
pricing sovereign risk, controlling for other relevant macro variables. The link is 
economically and statistically strong, and robust to the time dimension of the CDS 
premium, sample period, included control variables and estimation technique. We find 
that risk of default in the SWEAP group appeared to be somewhat “underpriced” relative 
to international norms in the period prior to the global financial crisis and substantially 
“overpriced” countries during and after the crisis, especially in 2010, with actual CDS 
values much higher than the model would predict given fundamentals. In addition, 
compared to the matched group, controlling for fiscal space and macroeconomic 
conditions, all of the SWEAP countries have much higher default risk assessments 
measured by CDS premiums.  
The next section discusses the data.  The third section provides a preliminary 
statistical analysis.  The fourth section presents the empirical results.  We close the paper 
with a discussion on possible interpretation of the emerging SWEAP risk premia, 
including the handicapping effect of being a member of a currency union, which reduces 
the country’s scope of adjustment via exchange rate and monetary policy.   
 
2.  CDS Spreads as a Measure of Sovereign Default Risk 
2.1 CDS Spreads on Sovereign Bonds   5
We measure the market perception of sovereign default risk by the spreads on 
sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) at various maturities (tenors).
3  CDS instruments 
are mainly transacted in over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets. The spreads 
represent the quarterly payments that must be paid by the buyer of CDS to the seller for 
the contingent claim in the case of a credit event, in this case non-payment (or forced 
restructuring) of sovereign debt, and is therefore an excellent proxy for market-based 
default risk pricing.
4 The total CDS market grew from about 10 trillion USD in 2004, 
when statistics were first systematically reported, to a peak prior to the global financial 
crisis of almost 60 trillion USD in mid-2008, and then fell sharply. The estimated gross 
(net) notional amount of sovereign CDS outstanding was 2,447 (233) billion USD in 
2010, compared to about 2,196 billion USD in government-issued international debt 
securities (BIS, 2010). Figure 1 shows the outstanding notional amounts of CDS 
instruments on sovereign bonds across countries in late February 2011. Italy has the 
largest outstanding CDS notional amounts, at almost USD 300 billion, followed by 
Brazil, Spain and Turkey with notional amounts outstanding of over USD 150 billion. 
																																																								
3 See Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003) and Fontana and Scheicher (2010) for 
discussions of sovereign CDS markets.  
4 An alternative proxy for default risk is the interest rate spread of sovereign debt. From 
an empirical standpoint, there are three main advantages of using CDS spreads rather 
than interest rate spreads. Firstly, CDS statistics provide timelier market-based pricing 
with larger coverage of industrial and developing countries than sources for national bond 
market rates. Secondly, using CDS spreads avoids the difficulty in dealing with time to 
maturity as in the case of using interest rate spreads (of which the zero yields would be 
preferred). Recent estimates from the Bank for International Settlements suggest that the 
average original and the remaining maturities of government debt instruments vary 
markedly across countries (BIS, 2010). Thirdly, interest rate spreads embed inflation 
expectations and demand/supply for credit conditions as well as default risk. We are only 
interested in default risk.   6
Sovereign CDS provide a market-based real time indicator of sovereign credit 
quality and default risk. We consider sovereign CDS spreads at several maturities—three, 
five and ten-year maturities, across industrial countries and emerging markets. Despite 
the low probability of a credit event in most advanced economies, CDS markets are still 
active in most markets as buyers can use the sovereign CDS as a hedge and for mark-to-
market response.
5  Buyers of the sovereign CDS may or may not own the underlying 
government bonds. The latter case is termed ‘naked’ sovereign CDS, and frequently 
labeled as a speculation.   
CDS prices in our study are taken from CMA Datavision, a platform that is based 
on quotes collected from a consortium of over thirty independent swap market 
participants.  CMA aggregates the most recent quotes and delivers the data intraday. The 
quoting convention for CDSs is the annual premium payment as a percentage of the 
notional amount of the reference obligation. The sovereign CDS spreads are reported in 
basis points, with a basis point equals to $1,000 to insure $10 million of debt.
6  CDS 
spreads are London closing values. While CMA is not the sole provider of CDS prices, 
Mayordomo et al. (2010) find that, in a comparison of six major providers, CMA quotes 
are most consistent with a price discovery process.  The majority of sovereign CDS in the 
market are denominated in the US dollar; in our sample, about one-third of the CDS is 
Euro-denominated.  The CMA data set provides a broad coverage of CDS pricing over 
countries and years.  
																																																								
5 Sovereign CDS can also be used to supplement corporate CDS to hedge for country 
risk. 
6 For example, if the spread is 197 basis points, meaning 197,000 USD to insure against 
10,000,000 in sovereign debt for 10 years; 1.97% of notional amount needs to be paid 
each year, so 0.0197 x 10 million = $197,000 per year.   7
Appendix A provides data sources and Appendix B a list of countries in the entire 
sample, the subset of countries included in the empirical estimation, and means of 3, 5 
and10-year CDS spreads (in basis points), fiscal space and other macroeconomic 
indicators during the sample (2005-10).  
 
2.2 Empirical Studies on CDS Spreads  
Empirical studies of CDS (corporate and sovereign) are relatively new and 
usually deal with market microstructure issues. Our study, by contrast, is in line with the 
macro/international finance literature which considers macroeconomic determinants of 
country risk assessments and financial crises.  
Several findings are particularly relevant to our analysis.  As noted by Packer and 
Suthiphongchai (2003) and others, the CDS premium should in principle be 
approximately equal to the credit spread of the reference bond of the same maturity under 
certain conditions. However, Fontana and Scheicher (2010) demonstrate that the “basis”, 
i.e. difference between CDS spreads and the spreads on the underlying government 
bonds, was not zero in Eurozone CDS markets during late 2010. They suggest that 
sizable deviations are attributable to limits to arbitrage and slow moving capital. 
Secondly, at high frequency (intraday), differences in credit quality (measured by CDS 
prices) are found to explain sovereign yield spreads of the Euro area governments (Beber, 
Brandt, and Kavajecz, 2009).
7  Fontana and Scheicher (2010) argue that high CDS 
premium in late 2010 during the Eurozone debt crisis may be partly attributable to a 
																																																								
7 Beber et al. study microstructure data of bond quotes and transactions from the 
interdealer markets, covering Austria, Belgium, Finland, France Germany Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  Their sample period is April 2003 to December 2004.   8
decline in the appetite for credit-risky instruments and falling market liquidity rather than 
entirely due concerns about principle losses on outstanding sovereign debt.  In addition, 
empirical research finds that daily sovereign interest spreads are more likely to lead 
sovereign CDS spreads in emerging markets (Ammer and Cai, 2007).
8  Taken together, 
both studies suggest that sovereign interest rates and CDS spreads have common 
underlying causes, rather than one driving the other.   
There is evidence that CDS spreads may be driven by macro economic 
conditions. Amato (2005) decomposes CDS spreads into risk premium and risk aversion 
and finds that both are influenced by macroeconomic conditions. Packer and Zhu (2005) 
find that contractual terms influence CDS spreads, but that significant “regional effects” 
(differential pricing across regions) is also evident. Micu et al. (2006) also find that credit 
rating announcements have a large influence on CDS spreads. In explaining recent 
developments, Berndt and Obreja (2010) suggest that “economic catastrophe risk” rose 
sharply in 2007-08 pushing up CDS spreads. Cecchetti et al. (2010) plot several fiscal 
indicators against CDS spreads for advanced economies. They find correlations across 
countries with substantial heterogeneity.
9 Longstaff et al. (2011) study sovereign CDS of 
several emerging markets from October 2000 to January 2010.  They found that the 
sovereign spreads are more associated with global factors (US stock, treasury, and high 
																																																								
8 Ammer and Cai examine daily data from February 2001 to March 2005, covering 
Brazil, China, Colombia, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, and Uruguay.  On interest rates, 
CDS spreads, and speculation, see also the discussion of findings from the European 





yield markets) than local factors (stock return, exchange rate, and foreign reserve). 
Dooley and Hutchison (2009) find that financial, economic and regulatory “news” 
emanating from the U.S. during the global financial crisis quickly impacted sovereign 
CDS spreads in emerging markets.  
 
 
3. Statistical  Contours 
Monthly 5-year CDS spreads from 2005-2011 are plotted for the SWEAP and 
other selected countries (countries which are matched with the SWEAP group, discussed 
below) in Figure 2.  Judging by these spreads, financial stress in global markets emerged 
in early 2008 but became dramatic and widespread in late 2008.  The turbulence subsided 
by mid-2009 in most countries, with the notable exception of the SWEAP group: Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.  For Greece, the unraveling of its fiscal condition in 
late 2009 resulted in a manifold increase in sovereign CDS spreads.  For Ireland, the 
sovereign CDS spreads have widen sharply twice, in early 2009 and in late 2010.  By 
2010, spreads of the SWEAP group were already much higher than those of most 
emerging market countries (e.g. above the spreads of South Africa, Mexico, Panama, 
Malaysia and Colombia in Figure 2). On the other hand, sovereign spreads of Germany 
and the US remained very low throughout the period (not shown).  
Table 1 reports the annual mean values (standard deviation in parentheses) of 
sovereign CDS spreads (5-year tenor), fiscal space and macroeconomic fundamentals for 
SWEAP and other country groupings. The table shows average values for the period 
before crisis (2005-07) and during the crisis (2008-10 and individual years). The fall of   10
2008 was the height of the global financial crisis, while the latter part of 2009 was a 
recovery period as financial panic and the liquidity crisis subsided for most countries. 
However, the SWEAP sovereign debt crisis manifested mainly in 2010 and later. Prior to 
the crisis, SWEAP CDS values were quite low, ranging from 8-17 basis points on 
average, which are somewhat but not markedly higher than the mean of other Euro 
countries (11 basis points) and lower than the non-Euro OECD group (35 basis points). 
During the early months into the global financial crisis, 2008-09, sovereign CDS spreads 
rose in virtually every country. However, spreads dropped very substantially in all 
regions by 2010 except for the Euro area excluding SWEAP, where it remained roughly 
unchanged, and SWEAP, where it rose dramatically. SWEAP CDS average values in 
2010 ranged from 238 basis points in Italy to 1027 basis points in Greece. By contrast, in 
2010, OECD countries (non-Euro members) had an average CDS spread of 118 basis 
points and non-SWEAP Euro members had an average spread of 101 basis points.  
As our main objective is to investigate the link between fiscal space and the 
pricing of default risk, we also track the adjustment of fiscal capacity across countries. 
Table 1 shows the fiscal balance to tax base ratio and the public debt to tax base ratio. 
OECD (excluding the Euro countries) and non-SWEAP Euro countries experienced an 
increase in debt/tax ratios by 0.2 percent and 0.3 percent, respectively, between 2005-07 
and 2010.  For Ireland and Greece, the deterioration in fiscal circumstances was much 
more drastic: the government debt of Ireland climbed from 25% of GDP in 2007 to 
almost 100% of GDP in 2010, while the government debt of Greece grew from 95% to 
over 140%.  As a result, the debt/tax ratio of Ireland jumped from 0.9 to 3.2 and that of 
Greece from 3.2 to 4.5, leaving both countries with a much less room for a flexible policy   11
response on the fiscal side. The large increase of debt/tax ratios in both countries captures 
a high degree of distress in their economic fundamentals, including the government 
assumption of banking sector liabilities in the case of Ireland. Similarly large 
deteriorations in fiscal space for these countries are also evident in the fall in fiscal 
balance to tax ratios.  
We illustrate further the 2005-07 fiscal preconditions, as measured by debt/tax 
(and debt/gdp) and deficit/tax (deficit/gdp), in the two panels of Figure 3 by country 
group.  Lower pre-crisis government debt and lower fiscal deficits relative to the tax base 
imply greater fiscal capacity. The figure shows that fiscal space was weakest (highest 
levels of debt and deficits relative to the tax base) in the middle-income countries, 
although the average debt to gdp ratio was lower than the other groups. This reflects 
generally lower tax bases in the middle income countries. Generally, the SWEAP had 
more limited fiscal space during the tranquil period than other high-income groups – 
higher average debt and deficits to the relative to the tax base (despite a significant 
budget surplus in Ireland during this period), and a higher level of debt to GDP.   
 
4.  Methodology and Empirical Results 
4.1 Methodology  
The dependent variables in our formal empirical work are sovereign CDS spreads 
of 5 year maturity (regressions with 3 and 10-year maturities are shown in the appendix 
table),
10 estimated in a panel regression, yit i t yit1   it+it ; where y is the 
																																																								
10 Our CDS data set contains 1-10 year maturities.  We focus on the 5-year maturity since 
this is the deepest and most actively traded CDS market. While there is no precise   12
CDS spread, i stands for country and t for year; X is a vector of controls.  The sample 
covers a panel of 60 countries from 2005-10.  The vector X includes fiscal space 
(government debt/tax and fiscal deficit/tax)—the focus of our work—as well as several 
other variables that frequently employed in the literature to explain country risk. These 
variables are the TED spread, external debt (total foreign liabilities/GDP), trade openness 
(trade/GDP) and inflation.  
As the conditions for consistent estimation in the dynamic panel are known to be 
demanding, our solution is to work with both a simple fixed-effects model and other 
estimation specifications, including clustered standard errors and the Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel estimator. Arellano-Bond is a GMM estimator with a instruments 
(exogenous and lagged values), well suited to the problem at hand, with a substantially 
larger number of cross-section units (50 countries), but requires many period of data as 
the instruments to account for the correlation of lagged dependent variable and the 
unobserved error terms. We consider fixed effects, clustered standard errors, and GMM 
in several variants of the model as bounding the causal effects of interest.  The sovereign 
spreads are estimated in level.  We also consider for GMM the dependent variable in log 
multiplied by a hundred, allowing the coefficients to be interpreted in terms of a 
percentage change of sovereign default risks (this terminology also aligns with standard 
practice in the financial sector that discusses the percentage change of CDS spreads).  
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
international account of government debt maturity, recent statistics suggest that the 
average original maturity of central government debts is around 10 years for both 
emerging markets and industrial countries (BIS, 2010). Hence, we also report results for 
10-year maturities in the appendix, as well as 3-year maturities for a robustness test.   13
4.2  Dynamics of CDS Spreads and Euro/SWEAP Pricing Differentials 
Table 2 considers the dynamics and structure of CDS pricing over the 2005-10 
sample period.  Differential pricing for the SWEAP and other Eurozone countries (non-
SWEAP) is investigated.  To focus on CDS pricing dynamics during the global and 
European financial turmoil, we include time dummy variables (t2008-t2010) for three 
crisis years: 2008 is identified as the central part of the global financial crisis, 2009 is 
identified as a partial recovery period, and 2010 is identified with the SWEAP debt crisis 
and post-global financial crisis. We also include interaction terms between the three time 
dummy variables and the SWEAP countries (dummy variables denoting a SWEAP 
country) and between the three dummy variables and the non-SWEAP Euro countries.  
In all of the CDS spread regressions, the fiscal space measure (higher value is 
equivalent to lower fiscal capacity) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level – higher levels of sovereign debt and fiscal positions (deficit or debt) relative to the 
tax base significantly increase market pricing of sovereign default risk.  Specifically, a 
percentage point rise in the debt/tax ratio is estimated to increase the 5-year CDS spread 
by between 15-81 basis points, while a one percentage point rise in the fiscal balance to 
tax base ratio is estimated to lower the spread by 194-829 basis points. The wide 
variation in the estimates, all highly statistically significant, varies with the specific 
estimation methodology—the low estimates are associated with estimation with clustered 
standard errors and the high estimates associated with fixed effects estimation. Of the 
control variables, only inflation is systematically and robustly correlated with CDS 
spreads (higher inflation leads to higher spreads). Appendix C.1 and C.2 provide the   14
robustness checks, supporting the effect of fiscal conditions on sovereign spreads in 
different econometric specifications.
11    
All of the coefficients on the 2008-10 year dummy variables are economically 
large and statistically significant.  Controlling for other factors, sovereign spreads in 2008 
were 295-349 points higher than average rates over the 2005-10 period for full sample of 
countries. Spreads were much lower in 2009, by some estimates somewhat lower than 
sample average spreads, but rose somewhat on average in 2010. For the full sample, the 
financial crisis impact on CDS spreads was concentrated in 2008.   
For Euro countries, including the SWEAP group, sovereign spreads were 
substantially less than the international average in 2008. SWEAP CDS were spreads were 
159-249 points lower than average spreads prevailing in 2008. SWEAP spreads were 
somewhat above the average in 2009 and then rose sharply in 2010, recording levels 174-
324 points above average. It is evident that sovereign default risk in the SWEAP was 
differentially priced much higher than the average of other countries, and moved in the 
opposite direction of the international trend in 2010.  Risk assessments were falling 
around most of the world in 2010 but rising sharply in the SWEAP group.    
  
																																																								
11 For GMM estimation, the test statistics (p-values reported) indicate that these dynamic 
panel regressions perform well on the whole sample.  The Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions has a null hypothesis of exogenous instruments; in all cases, corresponding p-
values of the Sargan test cannot reject the null.  The AR(1) test has a null of no 
autocorrelation in first differences and the AR(2) test has a null of no autocorrelation in 
levels; in most cases, the test cannot reject that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 [AR(1)] is 0, whereas the results from AR(2) test are inconclusive (given that 
time dimension of the panels in GMM is constrained to 6 at most, 2005-10, subject to the 
construction of the lagged instrument values).  The Sargan test provides some level of 
confidence that the residuals are uncorrelated with a group of explanatory variables.   15
4.2  CDS Spreads, Fundamentals and Structural Change 
The focus on dynamics highlight how SWEAP experienced much higher CDS 
spreads than most of the world in 2010, even controlling for their deteriorating fiscal 
situation and other factors. Table 3 considers stability issues by estimating the model over 
the full balanced sample, 2005-10 (columns 1-4), pre-crisis sample (2005-07, columns 5-
8) and crisis sample (2008-10, columns 9-12). The sub-samples are symmetric by 
including the same set of countries over a period of three years. The same set of control 
variables is also included in these regressions, with a focus on fiscal space, but the time 
dummies and interactive terms are excluded.   
The estimates for the full sample in Table 3 are included for comparison with the 
results in Table 2 which include time dummies and interactive terms. The results, not 
surprisingly, are very similar. However, important differences are evident in the estimates 
from the two sub-samples. In particular, all of the fiscal space estimates are highly 
statistically and economically important in the pre-crisis “tranquil” 2005-07 sample, 
shown in columns 5-8.  Debt and deficits relative to the tax base clearly lead to much 
higher risk assessments and CDS spreads.  
As noted, a structural break appears to have occurred during the turbulent 2008-
10 crisis episode, shown in columns 9-12. During the crisis, pricing of risk is largely 
decoupled from our two fiscal space measures. The ability of the model to explain CDS 
spreads drops from around 70-80% in the tranquil period to 45-60% during the crisis. 
Although explanatory power of fiscal space measures drop during the crisis, the TED 
spread, trade openness, external debt and inflation play a larger role. Given turbulent 
conditions during the crisis period, markets apparently did not focus on current fiscal   16
fundamentals. One interpretation is that the markets simply overreacted and mispriced 
risk of default. Another interpretation is that markets may have emphasized more on 
expectations of future deterioration in fiscal space that were not fully reflected in current 
economic conditions.
12 The emergence of the TED spread as a key pricing factor in the 
crisis also suggests that expectations of market volatility jumped during the crisis and that 
this pushed up CDS spreads. In particular, possible default implies that the payoff to 
creditors is weakly concave (fixed payoff in good times, declining with an adverse shock 
above a threshold in bad times), suggesting that higher volatility will reduce the expected 
payoff in countries exposed to higher volatility during a crisis for a given debt/tax or 
debt/gdp and thereby increasing CDS spreads.
13 This also explains the impact of the end 
of the Great Moderation—countries with greater exposure to volatility, other things 
equal, are facing higher spreads.  
  
4.3  SWEAP and the Euro-Area CDS Pricing Before and During the Crisis 
																																																								
12 We also investigated whether the pricing of CDS spreads amongst the SWEAP and the 
non-SWEAP Euro countries (Euro-SWEAP) respond differently to fundamentals than the 
rest of world when the full set of fundamental explanatory variables is included.  We 
estimated the model over 2005-10, reflecting the full sample and consisting of both the 
tranquil and turbulent periods.  We focused on 10-year CDS spreads and considered 
interaction terms of SWEAP and Euro-SWEAP with all of the fundamental variables.  
The point estimates of interaction terms on government debt/tax suggest that the non-
SWEAP Euro area countries have much narrower spreads than the sample average and 
the SWEAP area have much larger spreads.  However, these differences are not 
statistically significant.  The same result holds for the other fundamental factors.  One 
exception is the trade openness variable: on average, trade openness is positively 
associated with CDS spreads, but less than average for non-SWEAP Euro area and more 
than average for SWEAP.  We omit these results for brevity.  They are available upon 
request. 
13	A related point is made by Aizenman and Marion (2002).    17
In order to determine how the balanced sample (2005-10) and pre-crisis sample 
(2005-07) models of Table 3 predict for various country groups and the SWEAP 
countries, we report the in-sample and out-of-sample prediction errors over various years 
in Table 4. Our objective is to determine whether prediction errors demonstrate a 
discernable pattern. The in-sample prediction errors are estimated from the full sample 
model estimates reported in column 3 of Table 3 and the out-of-sample errors are 
estimated from the pre-crisis sample estimates reported in column 9 of Table 3.    
For exposition purposes, we calculate the prediction errors in Table 4 as a ratio of 
the actual relative to the predicted CDS spreads as:   
          	       	
   
   
 	  
      	5     .   	      
         	5       	   	      
 
Hence, if the prediction error is greater than 1, we have a case of under-prediction 
which provides supportive evidence that the CDS is over-priced. Table 4 reports the 
prediction errors by individual SWEAP countries and country grouping for the 2008-10 
and a breakdown for years 2008, 2009 and 2010.   
The table shows that in-sample and out-of-sample prediction errors were very 
substantial across countries and country-groups during the crisis period, with out-of-
sample errors particularly large. Average errors over 2008-10, for example, indicate that 
actual CDS spreads exceeded out-of-sample forecast spreads with multiples ranging from 
2.3 (Middle Income countries) to 12.9 (non-Euro OECD). Under predictions of CDS 
spreads of this magnitude are extraordinary. Under predictions (out-of-sample) for the 
SWEAP countries are not particularly high in relative terms, ranging from 2.6 (Italy) to 
5.3 (Ireland).    18
However, the pattern across years of the crisis sample shows a divergence 
between the SWEAP and other country groups. In particular, the SWEAP prediction 
errors were relatively low in 2008 but climbed marked in 2010 compared to other regions 
(except the non-SWEAP Euro area). The financial crisis that emerged in 2008 struck the 
OECD (non-Euro) area particularly hard, with very high out-of-sample prediction errors 
(31.6). These errors were only 1.6 in 2009, and climbed to 5.4 in 2010. By contrast, the 
SWEAP area did not experience such dramatic prediction errors in 2008 but these errors 
rose marked in 2009 and especially 2010. Perhaps reflecting some contagious effect, the 
Euro area (excluding SWEAP), also experience a dramatic climb in prediction errors in 
2010—much larger than the SWEAP group.  
 
4.4   Preconditions: Fiscal Positions Prior to the Financial Crisis 
Figure 3 suggests that, in the run up to the global financial crisis, fiscal positions 
in the Euro area were relatively strong, and the SWEAP area roughly in line with other 
OECD countries. The figure shows the fiscal balance and public debt positions by 
country group--middle income, high income (non-OECD), SWEAP, OECD (non-Euro 
area) and the Euro area (non-SWEAP) -- before the global financial crisis: the 2005-07 
average for fiscal balance to GDP and fiscal balance to tax base in the first part of the 
figure, and the 2005-07 average public debt to GDP and public debt to tax base ratio in 
the second part of the figure.  
Fiscal conditions in Euro countries less the SWEAP were in line with other 
countries prior to the global financial crisis. The average debt/tax ratio (1.38) was lower 
than the average of other OECD countries (1.66). The Euro area debt/GDP (55%) was   19
slightly higher than other OECD countries (51%).  The SWEAP group had a somewhat 
worse fiscal position, but not markedly so, with an average debt/tax ratio of 1.94 over the 
period, somewhat above the non-Euro OECD group average (1.66). This is much less 
than the average for the middle income group (2.75).  However, the SWEAP debt to GDP 
ratio was higher than the other groups at an average 68% over the period running up to 
the financial crisis. A similar pattern is seen for fiscal balance measures, shown in the 
second part of Figure 3.  
Are fiscal conditions prior to the crisis linked to market responses during the 
crisis episode?  To recall, in the years leading to the Euro, prominent US economists 
were skeptical about the Euro project, raising questions about the logic of monetary 
unification without deep fiscal unification. Arguably, the first ten years of the Euro, 
celebrated in 2008, were taken by the market and key observers as an illustration that the 
earlier fiscal concerns were overblown.  This view was supported by the remarkable 
switch of the initial depreciation of the Euro against the US dollar, into a solid 
appreciation.
   In his Keynote at Frankfurt am Main 30 May 2008, “The Eurosystem and its 
Prospects - History in the Making” Professor Axel Weber, President of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, noted  
“In 1998, however, the kick-off of the Eurosystem was regarded not only with 
curiosity and optimism, but also with concern and skepticism. On the one hand, 
pessimists predicted that the euro would be short-lived. They did not want to part with 
their respective national currencies, which – as in the case of the D-Mark – had often 
evolved into a symbol of national identity. On the other hand, the euro's proponents 
believed that the single currency would become a major catalyst for structural reform, 
thereby significantly boosting economic growth in the euro area. Today, with the benefit 
of hindsight, we know that neither excessive pessimism nor exuberant optimism was 
justified. Nonetheless, the Eurosystem has delivered a remarkable performance over its 
first decade.”  	  20
“Now, what are the determinants of the Eurosystem’s success? Why did a currency 
area with no track record of its own attain such a high degree of credibility in so short a 
time?  As I have already indicated, the bulk of confidence in the fledgling European 
single currency was generated by the Eurosystem’s institutional framework, which 
encompasses its independence, its mandate and its monetary policy strategy, plus an 
institutional framework geared at commanding the support of equally stability-oriented 
fiscal policies, as embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact  (SGP). Key elements of this 
institutional framework have been transferred to the Eurosystem from the national 
central banks (NCBs), including the Deutsche Bundesbank. Consequently, with the 
transfer of parts of the NCBs’ structure and ethos, the reputation of the currencies that 
were stable prior to EMU has lived on in the euro.” 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, in the years prior to the 2008-9 crisis hitting 
SWEAP, the market may have underestimated the fiscal challenges facing the Euro 
block, believing that Weber’s position “with the transfer of parts of the national central 
banks’ structure and ethos, the reputation of the currencies that were stable prior to 
EMU has lived on in the euro.” was accurate.    
Has the SWEAP crisis has been a wake-up call regarding the fiscal vulnerabilities 
of the Euro Zone?  Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of government fiscal space in 2005-07 
prior to the financial crisis against 2008-10 prediction errors in Euro and non-Euro zone 
countries (using equations 6 and 8 from Table 3). The left panels show the debt/tax 
revenue measure and the right panels show the deficit/tax revenue fiscal space measure. 
The correlation in the Euro zone (non-Euro area) between government debt/tax revenues 
and prediction error is -.72 (-.28). And the correlation in the Euro zone (non-Euro area) 
between fiscal balances to tax revenues and prediction error is .59 (.09) for other (non 
Euro) countries in the sample. Euro area countries with high debt and deficits (surpluses) 
during the pre-crisis period experienced lower (higher) CDS spreads (relative to 
predicted values) than did the non-Euro area countries.    21
Overall, these data do not support the argument that the market was particularly 
sanguine about Euro area sovereign risk during the tranquil period and that this led to an 
over-reaction (over pricing risk) during the crisis period. CDS spreads relative to out-of-
sample predicted values in the SWEAP group are high, but not out of line with other 
country groups. Moreover, there is no evidence that debt and deficits in the SWEAP 
countries prior to the crisis led to high prediction errors during the crisis.   
 
4.5  SWEAP Compared to “Matched” Middle Income Countries 
To gain further insight, we “match” the SWEAP countries with 5 middle-income 
countries (MI) that in 2010, at the peak of the European crisis, were closest in terms of 
fiscal space (2010 debt/tax).  The objective is to see if the pricing of risk in the SWEAP 
was different than corresponding MI countries. The matches (SWEAP to MI), shown in 
Table 5, are Spain – South Africa, Greece – Panama, Ireland – Malaysia, Italy – Mexico 
and Portugal – Colombia. These countries had similar debt to tax base ratios in 2010. The 
question is whether they had other similar economic characteristics, especially the price 
of sovereign default risk.  
Figure 5 shows a cluster diagram of the prediction errors during these two 
periods, depicting the size of debt/tax by circles. The prediction errors are based on the 
in-sample prediction errors from equations 2 and 4 in Table 3. The circle size is 
proportional to the 2005-07 pre-crisis public debt to tax base ratio. There is a negative 
correlation (-0.62) between 2005-07 pre-crisis and 2008-10 crisis prediction errors, i.e. 
large (small) prediction errors in the tranquil period tend to be followed by small (large) 
prediction errors in the crisis period. However, there is a wide asymmetry between the   22
clusters of errors of the SWEAP and the clusters of errors of their matched MI countries. 
In particular, the relatively small prediction errors of the SWEAP countries in the pre-
crisis period are followed by quite large prediction errors in the crisis period. By contrast, 
little relation is seen in the error clusters of the MI countries—a wide variation among the 
prediction errors in this group in the pre-crisis period is not seen in the crisis period, 
during which time all of the matched MI country predictions were quite close to realized 
CDS spreads.  
The data in Figure 5 suggest that sovereign risk in SWEAP countries is over-
priced in comparison with corresponding MI countries. Pursuing this further, Table 5 
summarizes in more detail the characteristics of the SWEAP with the matched countries. 
The table shows, before and during the crisis, the evolution of CDS spreads, fiscal space, 
the tax base, inflation, currency depreciation, inflation external debt, foreign reserves, 
trade openness and real GDP growth.  
This table allows a detailed comparison of the matched countries.  In terms of 
initial conditions, for example, Italy and Mexico had very similar debt/tax ratios in 2005-
07 (2.2-2.5), but Mexico had much higher borrowing costs and sovereign CDS premium 
which were more than four times higher than Italy (57 points versus 13 points). 
Differential borrowing costs, however, were consistent with a weaker currency and 
higher inflation rates in Mexico. The difference in CDS spreads between the two 
countries at this time appears is in line with relative fiscal space—similar debt and deficit 
positions-- and economic performance.  By 2010, however, the roles were reversed: Italy 
had a CDS spread of 238 and Mexico 113, despite still having very similar debt/tax and 
deficit/tax ratios and Mexico maintaining higher rates of inflation. Pessimism about   23
Europe in 2010 appears to have led to higher risk perceptions in Italy compared to 
Mexico than would be justified by fundamentals.  This observation is seen as well in 
Figure 5, where the prediction errors for 2008-10 averaged about 1.0 in Mexico and 2.6 
in Italy. (It should be noted, however, that real GDP growth was stronger in Mexico than 
Italy at this time, and its currency stronger. So not all fundamentals pointed to more equal 
CDS spreads).  
Another illustrative case is Spain and South Africa.  The 2005-07 (debt/tax) ratios 
were very similar, but South Africa was subject to higher government borrowing costs 
and had a substantially higher CDS spread (53 points versus 17 points). Partly this 
reflected the respective political situations but also that South Africa had higher inflation 
and a higher rate of currency depreciation. Again, the market pricing of risk was reversed 
in the two countries by 2010 with the CDS spread in Spain averaging 348 points 
compared to 124 in South Africa.  This difference may be partly due to fundamentals—
real GDP growth was higher and the debt/tax ratio lower in South Africa.  On the other 
hand, the inflation rate in South Africa was almost 6% in 2010, compared to less than 3% 
in Spain.  The suspicion that default risk in Spain is mispriced compared to South Africa 
is also suggested by the prediction error given in Figure 5—the average CDS spread to 
predicted spread for Spain during 2008-10 is almost 4 but about 1 in South Africa, where 
the later indicates no under- or over-pricing.   
On the other hand, Table 5 also shows that SWEAP had lower foreign reserves 
than the matched MI countries. Given the Euro status of SWEAP, however, it is uncertain 
what would be the role of the reserves (compared to a precautionary rationale for reserves 
hoarding of the emerging markets).  Nonetheless, in all cases SWEAP countries had   24
larger external debt (%GDP) and the government bond markets that performed worse in 
2010 than the matched MI countries. 
In summary, there is strong evidence that high market default risk assessments in 
the SWEAP are partly attributable to deteriorating fundamentals but that a large 
component is unpredicted.  Actual CDS spreads in the SWEAP much higher than what 
the model predicts, given the actual realization of fundamentals. In terms of the model, 
these spreads may be “mispriced” due to excessive pessimism on the part of market 
participants about the SWEAP or expectations of the further deterioration of 
fundamentals.  This point is well illustrated by a comparison of SWEAP with MI 
countries with similar fiscal conditions.  In every case, risk pricing of the SWEAP is 
comparatively high given current economic conditions. However, a comparison with 
other country groupings, outside of the Middle Income countries, provides less support 
for relative over-pricing of risk in SWEAP. In particular, other OECD countries (outside 
of the Euro zone) and non-SWEAP Euro zone countries have also experienced very high 
CDS premiums—much higher than model predictions—during the crisis period.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We develop a model of pricing of sovereign risk for a large number of countries 
within and outside of Europe, before and after the global financial crisis, based on fiscal 
space and other economic fundamentals.  We use this model to explain CDS spreads and 
determine whether the market pricing of risk is comparable in the affected European 
countries and elsewhere in the world.  By this methodology and using out-of-sample 
predictions, we determine whether there are systematically large prediction errors for the   25
CDS spreads during the global financial crisis period 2008-10 and especially 2010 when 
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe surfaced.  
We find that market-priced risk of sovereign debt as measured by CDS spreads is 
partly explained by fiscal space and other economic determinants.  Fiscal space is an 
economically important and robust predictor of CDS spreads using a data set of more 
than fifty countries over 2005-10, measured either by government debt/tax base or 
government deficits/tax base.  In addition to validating that fiscal space is an important 
determinant of market-based sovereign risk, we find evidence of mispricing in SWEAP 
given current fiscal space and other current fundamentals: unpredicted low CDS in 
tranquil period and unpredicted high during global crisis period, especially 2010 when 
sovereign debt crisis swept over Euro area.  We also matched the SWEAP with 5 middle-
income countries outside Europe that were closest in terms of fiscal space (debt/tax) 
during the crisis period.  We find that SWEAP default risk is priced much higher than the 
“matched” countries in 2010, even allowing for differentials in fiscal space and other 
fundamentals.  
On the other hand, outside of the Middle Income countries, several country 
groups experienced similarly “mispriced” CDS spreads during the crisis period, though 
the dynamics are different than with SWEAP. Other OECD countries tended to have very 
high prediction errors—high CDS spreads compared with model predictions—during the 
first year of the international financial and liquidity crisis (2008), while SWEAP 
experienced very substantial prediction errors in 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis 
initially swept over Europe.    26
One interpretation of these findings is that market-priced risk of sovereign default 
follows waves of contagion, overreacting and mispricing risk of sovereign default over a 
period of several years.  The extraordinarily high CDS spreads in SWEAP in 2010, 
largely unpredicted by the model, may be attributable to excessive pessimism and an 
overreaction to the fiscal deterioration.  Another interpretation, of course, is that the CDS 
market is pricing default risk not primarily on current fundamentals but future 
fundamentals, expecting the SWEAP fiscal space to deteriorate markedly.  The 
adjustment challenges of the SWEAP may be viewed as economically and politically 
more difficult due to exchange rate inflexibility associated with participation in the Euro 
area that is not a constraint in the matched group of the middle income countries.    27
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December. Appendix A.  Data Sources.
Sovereign CDS Spreads The CDS pricing is based on London closing values collected from a consortium of over thirty swap market participants.
CDS are denominated in US$, except for the following in Euro: ct, cz, dk, hn, ic, ln, mr, po, rm, sx, sj, es, sd, tk, and ur.
Source: CMA Datavision.
Tax Base The ratio of tax divided by GDP, averaged over the period of previous five years to account for business cycle fluctuations.
Source: World Bank's WDI, IMF Article IV Consultation documents, OECD, and Eurostat.
Fiscal Balance/Tax Base The ratio of fiscal balance/GDP divided by tax base; positive fiscal balance means fiscal surplus.
Source: World Bank's WDI, IMF Article IV Consultation documents, and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).
Public Debt/Tax Base The ratio of public debt/GDP divided by tax base.
Source: IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, Article IV Consultation documents, and World Economic Outlook.
Trade/GDP The ratio of (exports+imports) divided by GDP.
Source: WDI and EIU.
Inflation Annual consumer price inflation (%).
Source: WDI and EIU.
External Debt/GDP The ratio of total private and public external debt divided by GDP.
Source: WDI and EIU.
Nominal Depreciation Annual depreciation of local currency against US$ (%).
Source: WDI and EIU.
Foreign Reserves/GDP The ratio of foreign reserves divided by GDP.
Source: WDI and EIU.
Real GDP Growth Annual growth of real GDP.
Source: WDI and EIU.
GDP per Capita Real GDP per capita in US$
Source: WDI and EIU.
TED Spread The difference between the 3-month US$ LIBOR and the 3-month US Treasury Bill (%).
Source: Datastream.Appendix B. Country Details and Average Statistics for 2005-10.
Group Country World Bank Datastream CDS 5-yr. CDS 3-yr. CDS 10-yr. Fiscal Balance/Tax Base Public Debt/Tax Base Trade/GDP Inflation (%) External Debt/GDP
Middle-Income Argentina ARG ag 1075.29 1117.72 1124.23 0.07 4.40 0.43 9.42 0.46
Brazil BRA br 159.93 119.36 201.43 -0.08 2.02 0.25 4.90 0.17
Bulgaria BGR bl 184.12 174.90 200.47 0.04 0.67 1.22 6.38 0.89
China CHN ch 65.01 54.53 74.05 -0.09 1.13 0.62 2.97 0.10
Colombia COL cb 162.89 123.63 205.50 -0.05 1.88 0.36 4.65 0.22
Indonesia IDN id 239.35 194.73 285.49 -0.07 2.89 0.55 8.39 0.34
Kazakhstan KAZ kz 231.61 215.06 231.58 -0.05 0.33 0.89 9.68 0.84
Lebanon LBN lb 355.40 313.76 390.27 -0.65 10.98 0.69 4.30 1.12
Lithuania LTU ln 219.50 205.86 231.34 -0.18 1.14 1.25 4.87 0.65
Malaysia MYS my 79.16 64.84 89.04 -0.30 3.03 1.92 2.72 0.32
Morocco MAR mc 141.84 128.77 158.56 -0.10 2.52 0.75 2.04 0.27
Panama PAN pa 147.52 112.87 186.98 -0.03 4.80 1.49 4.25 0.53
Peru PER pe 161.63 124.87 201.94 0.06 2.20 0.48 2.59 0.27
Phillipines PHL ph 202.85 155.23 248.76 -0.15 3.93 0.81 5.04 0.45
Romania ROM rm 224.50 225.68 243.59 -0.14 0.87 0.74 6.52 0.54
Russia RUS rs 212.01 217.74 221.97 0.07 0.29 0.53 10.44 0.28
South Africa ZAF sa 137.14 121.33 157.06 -0.06 1.22 0.61 5.08 0.14
Thailand THA th 95.42 81.22 109.01 -0.08 2.68 1.40 3.24 0.26
Tunisia TUN tu 101.13 89.59 117.74 -0.13 2.19 1.12 8.23 0.57
Ukraine UKR ur 898.71 930.54 898.67 -0.08 0.68 0.97 13.71 0.57
Venezuela VEN ve 1024.69 1037.80 1011.23 -0.20 2.49 0.52 22.82 0.23
Vietnam VNM vi 226.40 174.97 249.79 -0.32 2.66 1.58 11.01 0.32
High-Income (non OECD) Croatia HRV ct 175.44 160.03 185.98 -0.16 1.71 0.87 3.01 0.85
Qatar QAT qa 78.93 63.71 100.60 0.45 0.80 0.87 8.02 0.58
South-West Euro Area Greece GRC gr 264.49 223.60 215.45 -0.27 3.60 0.54 5.49 1.46
Peripherals (SWEAP) Ireland IRL ir 163.98 131.80 134.86 -0.27 1.58 1.44 2.02 8.99
Italy ITA it 90.72 72.00 91.55 -0.09 2.62 0.55 2.05 1.10
Portugal PRT pt 119.41 101.44 103.67 -0.18 2.05 0.69 1.84 2.03
Spain ESP es 102.02 82.57 104.57 -0.09 1.30 0.56 2.61 1.50
OECD (non Euro) Australia AUS au 41.52 32.55 49.27 -0.02 0.46 0.40 2.91 0.95
Chile CHL cl 71.59 59.67 81.52 0.18 0.29 0.77 3.78 0.38
Czech CZE cz 65.23 54.69 73.90 -0.09 0.87 1.47 2.72 0.41
Denmark DNK dk 50.59 35.87 61.70 0.04 0.84 0.98 2.20 1.72
Hungary HUN hn 189.46 169.18 184.27 -0.15 1.86 1.54 5.16 1.01
Iceland ISL ic 288.02 303.63 266.12 -0.07 1.47 0.81 7.15 6.77
Israel ISR is 81.52 67.28 96.03 -0.06 2.30 0.80 2.68 0.52
Japan JPN jp 33.92 20.94 42.01 -0.17 7.39 0.30 -0.13 0.38
Korea KOR ko 97.59 89.40 107.91 0.03 1.23 0.90 3.14 0.35
Mexico MEX mx 118.24 97.59 142.15 -0.05 2.31 0.58 4.27 0.19
Norway NOR nw 18.19 13.04 23.16 0.35 1.29 0.73 2.30 1.25
Poland POL po 96.25 82.10 102.61 -0.07 1.48 0.81 2.67 0.46
Sweden SWE sd 52.76 37.19 66.38 0.03 0.88 0.94 1.68 1.86
Turkey TUR tk 201.54 165.60 242.63 -0.10 1.78 0.49 8.13 0.39
Euro (excluding SWEAP) Austria AUT oe 55.06 43.84 55.61 -0.05 1.49 1.07 1.88 2.05
Belgium BEL bg 61.43 39.22 50.78 -0.06 2.06 1.59 2.37 2.97
France FRA fr 34.58 24.04 34.78 -0.10 1.61 0.53 1.74 1.75
Germany DEU bd 23.77 16.76 24.59 -0.05 1.97 0.83 1.65 1.44
Netherlands NLD nl 45.84 33.15 68.73 -0.04 1.43 1.39 1.65 2.98
Slovak SVK sx 58.41 49.48 66.85 -0.13 1.06 1.73 2.92 0.57
Slovenia SVN sj 51.91 41.17 60.92 -0.06 0.75 1.28 2.74 0.97Table 1. Summary Statistics of Sovereign CDS Values and Fundamentals. 
This table reports mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of sovereign CDS spreads (basis points) and macro fundamentals.
Tax Base is an average Tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years. Appendix A provides data sources and Appendix B details the country groups.
Country 05-07 08 09 10 08-10 05-07 08 09 10 08-10 05-07 08 09 10 08-10
Spain 16.7 100.7 113.5 347.7 187.3 0.05 -0.12 -0.31 -0.27 -0.23 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.4
Greece 15.0 232.1 283.4 1026.5 514.0 -0.18 -0.29 -0.48 -0.33 -0.37 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.0
Ireland 8.6 181.0 158.0 619.2 319.4 0.05 -0.24 -0.47 -1.08 -0.60 0.9 1.5 2.2 3.2 2.3
Italy 13.4 156.9 109.2 238.0 168.0 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.7
Portugal 10.4 96.3 91.7 497.3 228.4 -0.13 -0.11 -0.30 -0.27 -0.22 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.2
Middle-Income group 124.2 829.9 295.2 233.2 452.8 -0.06 -0.08 -0.22 -0.19 -0.16 2.7 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3
(102.8) (1069.4) (331.3) (221.5) (540.7) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (2.6) (2.1) (1.9) (1.9) (2.0)
High-Income (non OECD) 32.1 330.7 164.0 172.3 222.3 0.13 0.24 0.10 0.16 0.17 1.2 1.0 1.7 1.4 1.4
(13.9) (158.9) (90.5) (118.4) (122.6) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.8) (0.6) (0.1) (0.8) (0.5)
OECD (non Euro) 34.8 260.3 120.3 117.8 166.2 0.04 0.01 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.8
(41.5) (238.8) (103.5) (96.4) (146.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (1.7) (1.7) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8)
Euro (excluding SWEAP) 11.0 95.1 54.2 101.3 83.5 -0.03 -0.02 -0.15 -0.14 -0.10 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.6
(13.3) (40.2) (24.6) (55.2) (40.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5)
05-07 08 09 10 08-10 05-07 08 09 10 08-10 05-07 08 09 10 08-10
Spain 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.55 1.40 0.80 2.78 1.66 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.6
Greece 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.32 2.64 2.97 17.34 7.65 1.3 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.7
Ireland 1.5 1.6 1.6 0.9 1.4 3.75 4.05 -4.48 1.30 0.29 7.8 8.9 10.7 11.0 10.2
Italy 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 2.30 2.26 1.02 2.10 1.79 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1
Portugal 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 2.60 0.71 0.00 2.52 1.08 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.2
Middle-Income group 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 6.74 9.73 5.24 6.61 7.19 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
(0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (4.7) (6.8) (5.9) (5.4) (6.0) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
High-Income (non OECD) 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 8.20 8.02 -0.90 1.37 2.83 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8
(0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (6.2) (7.3) (3.9) (0.7) (4.0) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
OECD (non Euro) 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 3.38 4.60 3.02 3.08 3.57 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.4
(0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (2.3) (3.4) (3.5) (1.4) (2.8) (1.1) (2.0) (2.5) (2.4) (2.3)
Euro (excluding SWEAP) 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 2.56 2.13 0.94 2.05 1.71 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9
(0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (1.0) (1.1) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7) (1.0) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9)
Sovereign CDS 5-yr tenor (basis points) Fiscal Balance/Tax Base Public Debt/Tax Base
Trade/GDP Inflation (%) External Debt/GDPTable 2. Dynamics of CDS Spreads. The dependent variable (y) is sovereign CDS 5-year tenor in basis points.
South-West Euro Area Periphery (SWEAP) includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Tax Base is an average Tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years. TED Spread (3-month US$ LIBOR - 3-month US Treasury) and Inflation are in percent.
All variables are in realtime (t), except the lagged CDS, y(t-1). Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) denoting statistical significance at 1 (5,10) level.
Balanced (Whole) Sample: 2005-10
           (1) (2) (3) (4)
           coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
t2008 295.6 (78.3) *** 334.1 (102.3) *** 328.0 (78.0) *** 349.3 (97.5) ***
t2009 35.4 (27.7) -4.7 (21.0) -36.8 (33.7) -35.5 (16.7) **
t2010 92.9 (27.1) *** 58.8 (12.7) *** 2.5 (32.6) 42.5 (14.0) ***
t2008 x Euro dummy -209.5 (80.7) *** -216.0 (84.5) ** -225.3 (82.3) *** -238.6 (80.3) ***
t2009 x Euro dummy -15.0 (30.8) 80.5 (30.4) *** 14.6 (30.1) 84.2 (29.4) ***
t2010 x Euro dummy -29.1 (28.0) 56.2 (24.3) ** 5.2 (26.6) 48.0 (26.5) *
t2008 x SWEAP -159.3 (82.7) * -194.4 (93.2) ** -249.5 (98.2) ** -235.6 (86.6) ***
t2009 x SWEAP 73.4 (36.1) ** 136.1 (30.8) *** 18.7 (58.6) 113.8 (34.1) ***
t2010 x SWEAP 261.9 (63.7) *** 324.4 (58.1) *** 174.4 (107.9) 287.7 (53.6) ***
TED Spread 7.3 (27.8) -0.8 (13.6) 3.2 (27.3) 1.3 (11.3)
y(t-1) 0.3 (0.1) *** 0.3 (0.1) *** 0.2 (0.1) *** 0.3 (0.0) ***
Trade/GDP -118.0 (128.8) -24.9 (29.2) -86.1 (150.7) -41.9 (28.1)
Inflation 19.8 (10.3) * 24.6 (6.2) *** 24.5 (11.9) ** 23.8 (6.0) ***
External Debt/GDP -1.9 (17.9) 7.9 (2.3) *** -36.6 (30.1) 3.7 (2.3)
Public Debt/Tax Base 81.0 (29.9) *** 14.7 (3.9) ***
Fiscal Balance/Tax Base -829.4 (302.0) *** -194.1 (55.9) ***
constant term -710.7 (347.2) ** -87.7 (25.6) *** 286.0 (271.7) -37.3 (26.0)
R
2 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.48
Observations 300 300 300 300
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50
Fixed Effects (i) Yes No Yes No
Serial Correlation y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1)
Clustered s.e. (i) No Yes No YesTable 3. CDS Spreads, Fundamentals and Structural Change. The dependent variable (y) is sovereign CDS 5-year tenor in basis points.
Tax Base is an average Tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years. TED Spread (3-month US$ LIBOR - 3-month US Treasury) and Inflation are in percent.
All variables are in realtime (t), except the lagged CDS, y(t-1). Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) denoting statistical significance at 1 (5,10) level.
           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Years 2005-10 Years 2005-10 Years 2005-10 Years 2005-10 Years 2005-07 Years 2005-07
           coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
TED Spread -29.6 (38.7) 17.5 (12.1) 64.1 (42.2) 43.6 (13.2) *** 34.5 (10.2) *** 23.2 (7.7) ***
y(t-1) 0.3 (0.1) *** 0.3 (0.0) *** 0.2 (0.1) *** 0.3 (0.0) *** 0.0 (0.1) 0.4 (0.1) ***
Trade/GDP -186.7 (168.9) 1.2 (21.9) 182.7 (182.2) -12.4 (25.3) -92.8 (50.8) * -14.0 (9.3)
Inflation 38.6 (12.3) *** 28.1 (3.0) *** 35.7 (12.9) *** 29.9 (3.5) *** 9.8 (2.2) *** 8.7 (1.3) ***
External Debt/GDP 57.0 (32.9) * 17.0 (3.5) *** -53.9 (37.2) 9.8 (4.7) ** -13.7 (11.2) 0.6 (1.3)
Public Debt/Tax Base 48.2 (48.7) 13.8 (4.6) *** 123.4 (33.1) *** 18.3 (3.0) ***
Fiscal Balance/Tax Base -910.3 (236.2) *** -418.7 (87.1) ***
constant term -389.5 (541.5) -87.3 (20.7) *** -501.7 (267.5) * -82.5 (30.0) *** 81.9 (100.1) -44.1 (10.9) ***
R
2 0.19 0.35 0.18 0.35 0.84 0.76
Observations 300 300 300 300 150 150
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50 50 50
Fixed Effects (i) Yes No Yes No Yes No
Serial Correlation y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1)
Clustered s.e. (i) No Yes No Yes No Yes
           (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample Years 2005-07 Years 2005-07 Years 2008-10 Years 2008-10 Years 2008-10 Years 2008-10
           coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
TED Spread 21.7 (7.7) *** 24.9 (6.6) *** 150.2 (42.1) *** 190.6 (65.7) *** 186.7 (45.1) *** 197.3 (62.8) ***
y(t-1) 0.2 (0.1) *** 0.5 (0.1) *** -0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.0) *** -0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.0) ***
Trade/GDP -58.9 (37.5) -24.6 (9.1) *** -489.7 (244.5) ** -94.5 (63.7) -191.4 (199.6) -96.4 (65.2)
Inflation 6.5 (1.7) *** 7.5 (1.4) *** 29.5 (11.6) ** 52.2 (5.3) *** 27.2 (9.0) *** 52.9 (5.2) ***
External Debt/GDP -5.2 (9.6) 1.4 (1.4) 189.3 (138.7) 28.6 (13.0) ** 33.0 (102.2) 21.5 (12.2) *
Public Debt/Tax Base -182.1 (218.7) 14.4 (13.1)
Fiscal Balance/Tax Base -291.7 (86.5) *** -202.9 (40.2) *** -567.4 (606.0) -150.7 (163.8)
constant term 107.4 (78.7) -6.8 (12.4) -621.4 (1134.7) -82.0 (64.0) -200.3 (801.8) -61.9 (59.9)
R
2 0.89 0.68 0.58 0.45 0.61 0.45
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50 50 50
Fixed Effects (i) Yes No Yes No Yes No
Serial Correlation y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1)
Clustered s.e. (i) No Yes No Yes No YesTable 4. Prediction Errors of Sovereign CDS Spreads. Based on the predicted values from estimation in Table 3 (eqs. (3) and (9)) using CDS 5-year tenor.
The out-sample prediction uses 2005-07 (pre-crisis period) observations.  The in-sample prediction uses 2005-10 (whole sample) observations.
Where Actual CDS > Predicted CDS, there is a signal of under-prediction (i.e. the sovereign default risk is over-priced).
The min and max provide lower and upper bounds of prediction errors extracted from the all the specifications with Fiscal Balance/Tax Base and macro controls.
Country/Group
2008 2009 2010 2008-10
out (in) sample prediction
Spain out  3.9 3.6 6.5 4.7
in  3.5 4.0 4.1 3.8
Greece out  2.7 2.2 3.3 2.7
in  2.3 1.8 1.7 1.9
Ireland out  4.2 3.8 7.9 5.3
in  0.8 1.7 2.6 1.7
Italy out  2.6 1.6 3.6 2.6
in  2.3 1.9 3.3 2.5
Portugal out  2.8 2.9 6.9 4.2
in  3.2 4.0 4.5 3.9
Middle-Income group out  3.9 1.0 1.8 2.3
in  2.7 1.2 1.2 1.7
OECD (non Euro) out  31.6 1.6 5.4 12.9
in  2.6 1.2 1.4 1.7
Euro (excluding SWEAP) out  5.0 5.8 13.7 8.2
in  2.1 4.2 3.2 3.2
Prediction Error = Actual CDS values divided by Predicted CDS valuesTable 5. Matching Middle-Income Countries to SWEAP Group.
Variable year Spain South Africa Greece Panama Ireland Malaysia Italy Mexico Portugal Colombia
2005-07 16.7 53.2 15.0 115.1 8.6 29.2 13.4 57.2 10.4 138.0
2008 100.7 395.7 232.1 306.8 181.0 225.1 156.9 291.8 96.3 307.5
Sovereign CDS 5-year tenor 2009 113.5 143.3 283.4 133.4 158.0 89.6 109.2 133.3 91.7 142.8
2010 347.7 124.3 1026.5 99.5 619.2 72.7 238.0 112.8 497.3 113.0
2008-10 187.3 221.1 514.0 179.9 319.4 129.1 168.0 179.3 228.4 187.8
2005-07 1.1 1.3 3.2 5.7 0.9 2.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.9
2008 1.1 1.0 3.5 3.9 1.5 2.8 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.7
Public Debt/Tax Base 2009 1.5 1.1 4.0 3.8 2.2 3.7 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9
2010 1.7 1.3 4.5 3.8 3.2 3.6 2.8 2.3 2.4 2.0
2008-10 1.4 1.2 4.0 3.9 2.3 3.3 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9
2005-07 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
2008 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Fiscal Balance/Tax Base 2009 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1
2010 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1
2008-10 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
2005-07 34.6 25.1 32.3 9.8 29.4 16.0 41.5 17.2 33.3 18.9
2008 35.7 26.7 31.8 10.5 30.3 15.2 41.8 17.7 33.9 18.7
Tax Base 2009 35.5 27.4 31.9 10.5 30.3 15.2 42.1 18.5 34.3 18.6
= avg.(t-1,…t-5) 2010 34.7 27.5 31.6 10.5 29.9 15.2 42.7 18.5 34.6 18.3
2008-10 35.3 27.2 31.7 10.5 30.2 15.2 42.2 18.2 34.3 18.5
2005-07 3.6 2.7 3.3 4.0 3.8 2.9 2.3 3.7 2.6 5.0
2008 1.4 8.2 2.6 6.8 4.1 4.5 2.3 6.5 0.7 7.7
Inflation (%) 2009 0.8 8.6 3.0 1.9 -4.5 1.0 1.0 3.6 0.0 2.0
2010 2.8 5.6 17.3 4.9 1.3 2.1 2.1 4.4 2.5 3.2
2008-10 1.7 7.5 7.7 4.5 0.3 2.5 1.8 4.8 1.1 4.3
2005-07 -1.8 3.0 -1.8 0.0 -1.8 -3.3 -1.8 -1.1 -1.8 -7.3
2008 5.0 17.3 5.0 0.0 5.0 -3.0 5.0 1.8 5.0 -5.3
Nominal Depreciation (%) 2009 -2.9 2.6 -2.9 0.0 -2.9 5.7 -2.9 21.4 -2.9 10.1
(against US$) 2010 5.4 -13.6 5.4 0.0 5.4 -8.6 5.4 -6.5 5.4 -12.4
2008-10 2.5 2.1 2.5 0.0 2.5 -2.0 2.5 5.6 2.5 -2.5
2005-07 1.4 0.1 1.3 0.6 7.8 0.4 1.1 0.2 1.9 0.2
2008 1.5 0.2 1.4 0.5 8.9 0.3 1.0 0.2 1.9 0.2
External Debt/GDP 2009 1.7 0.1 1.8 0.5 10.7 0.3 1.2 0.2 2.3 0.2
2010 1.5 0.1 1.7 0.5 11.0 0.3 1.1 0.2 2.4 0.2
2008-10 1.6 0.1 1.7 0.5 10.2 0.3 1.1 0.2 2.2 0.2
2005-07 1.5 9.9 1.1 8.5 0.4 52.9 4.1 8.4 5.1 9.9
2008 1.3 12.3 1.0 10.5 0.4 41.6 4.6 8.7 4.8 9.8
Foreign Reserves/GDP (%) 2009 1.9 13.9 1.7 12.3 1.0 50.1 6.2 11.4 6.8 10.7
2010 2.3 12.0 2.1 10.1 1.0 44.8 7.7 11.6 9.2 9.8
2008-10 1.8 12.7 1.6 10.9 0.8 45.5 6.2 10.6 6.9 10.1
2005-07 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.5 1.5 2.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.4
2008 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.4
Trade/GDP 2009 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.6 1.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.3
2010 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.9 1.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3
2008-10 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.5 1.4 1.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4
2005-07 3.7 5.5 3.7 9.3 5.9 5.9 1.4 3.8 1.5 6.1
2008 0.9 3.7 2.0 10.7 -3.0 4.7 -1.3 1.5 0.0 2.7
Real GDP Growth (%) 2009 -3.6 -1.8 -2.0 2.4 -7.1 -1.7 -5.0 -6.5 -2.6 0.8
2010 -0.2 2.8 -4.5 7.5 -1.0 7.2 1.3 5.5 1.3 4.3
2008-10 -1.0 1.6 -1.5 6.9 -3.7 3.4 -1.7 0.2 -0.4 2.6Appendix C.1. Dynamics of CDS Spreads 3-Year and 10-Year Tenor. This table provides a robustness check to Tables 2 and 3 across CDS 5, 3, and 10 tenor.
The dependent variable (y) is sovereign CDS 3-year and 10-year tenor in basis points. SWEAP includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Tax Base is an average Tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years. TED Spread (3-month US$ LIBOR - 3-month US Treasury) and Inflation are in percent.
All variables are in realtime (t), except the lagged CDS, y(t-1). Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) denoting statistical significance at 1 (5,10) level.
           Whole Sample 2005-10 Tranquility 2005-07 Crisis 2008-10
CDS 3-Year CDS 10-Year CDS 3-Year CDS 10-Year CDS 3-Year CDS 10-Year
           coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
t2008 304.2 (102.3) *** 349.4 (104.2) ***
t2009 -10.9 (17.8) -13.9 (22.3)
t2010 63.9 (14.2) *** 66.7 (14.9) ***
t2008 x Euro dummy -194.1 (82.2) ** -232.9 (85.6) ***
t2009 x Euro dummy 73.3 (30.5) ** 91.5 (34.7) ***
t2010 x Euro dummy 13.4 (20.9) 23.8 (19.2)
t2008 x SWEAP -174.5 (90.6) * -210.6 (94.6) **
t2009 x SWEAP 118.9 (31.4) *** 151.0 (34.9) ***
t2010 x SWEAP 226.4 (48.4) *** 158.7 (36.2) ***
TED Spread -0.5 (13.1) -1.4 (14.8) 35.3 (9.4) *** 28.8 (11.1) *** 155.1 (43.1) *** 134.0 (38.0) ***
y(t-1) 0.3 (0.0) *** 0.3 (0.1) *** -0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) -0.1 (0.1) -0.1 (0.1)
Trade/GDP -20.9 (32.3) -38.1 (29.9) -70.3 (45.6) -126.8 (60.4) ** -477.5 (245.3) * -438.5 (232.9) *
Inflation 22.3 (6.9) *** 25.0 (6.1) *** 6.4 (2.2) *** 12.1 (2.6) *** 27.2 (11.6) ** 26.6 (10.6) **
External Debt/GDP 8.4 (1.8) *** 5.0 (3.0) -14.8 (9.6) -16.9 (14.8) 194.4 (138.7) 207.6 (120.7) *
Public Debt/Tax Base 15.4 (4.8) *** 13.3 (4.1) *** 112.9 (33.0) *** 127.1 (31.1) *** -211.2 (222.6) -263.8 (207.4)
constant term -89.2 (31.0) *** -60.1 (24.3) ** -1046.5 (391.0) *** -1122.3 (366.7) *** -686.8 (1123.5) -743.4 (917.8)
R
2 0.42 0.48 0.75 0.88 0.56 0.58
Observations 300 300 150 150 150 150
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50 50 50
Fixed Effects (i) No No No No No No
Serial Correlation y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1) y(t-1)
Clustered s.e. (i) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Appendix C.2. Dynamics of CDS Spreads (continued). This table provides robustness checks to results in Tables 2 and 3.
The dependent variable (y) is sovereign CDS 5-year tenor in basis points. SWEAP includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Tax Base is an average Tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years. TED Spread (3-month US$ LIBOR - 3-month US Treasury) and Inflation are in percent.
The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions has a null hypothesis of exogenous instruments. The AR(#) test has a null of no autocorrelation in # differences.
All variables are in realtime (t), except the lagged CDS. Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) denoting statistical significance at 1 (5,10) level.
y = CDS in level y = CDS in 1st difference
           Whole Sample 2005-10 Whole Sample 2005-10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
           coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
t2008 372.1 (91.3) *** 378.0 (100.9) ***
t2009 -38.5 (17.3) ** 10.5 (22.4)
t2010 42.8 (16.2) *** 63.4 (14.4) ***
t2008 x Euro dummy -261.4 (75.7) *** -260.1 (86.1) ***
t2009 x Euro dummy 64.2 (36.9) * 53.1 (34.4)
t2010 x Euro dummy 24.3 (32.0) 27.4 (26.9)
t2008 x SWEAP -274.5 (80.1) *** -250.4 (94.9) ***
t2009 x SWEAP 79.8 (50.1) 100.0 (43.6) **
t2010 x SWEAP 242.5 (63.1) *** 260.0 (62.2) ***
TED Spread 0.5 (11.8) -10.1 (15.5) 103.8 (10.9) *** 70.7 (13.3) ***
y(t-1) 0.3 (0.0) *** 0.3 (0.0) *** -0.7 (0.0) *** -0.7 (0.0) ***
y(t-2) -0.8 (0.0) *** -0.7 (0.0) ***
y(t-3) 0.8 (0.1) *** 0.1 (0.1)
Trade/GDP -46.0 (27.3) * -23.0 (31.2) -273.2 (40.8) *** -186.8 (34.5) ***
Inflation 24.3 (5.7) *** 30.3 (6.5) *** 0.3 (1.4) 3.7 (1.9) **
External Debt/GDP 0.7 (3.5) 6.2 (5.3) 128.2 (20.7) *** 38.3 (8.9) ***
Fiscal Balance/Tax Base -134.2 (56.7) **
Fiscal Balance/GDP -10.1 (4.0) **
Public Debt/Tax Base 240.3 (14.8) ***
Public Debt/GDP 1.5 (0.4) ***
constant term -31.8 (28.2) -150.4 (41.4) *** 88.8 (9.9) *** 52.1 (10.2) ***
R
2 0.48 0.48 .48 .44
Observations 300 300 100 100
Countries (i) 50 50 50 50
Fixed Effects (i) No No Yes Yes
Serial Correlation y(t-1) y(t-1) Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond
Clustered s.e. (i) Yes Yes -- --
p-value: Sargan tests -- -- 0.6165 0.8504
AR(1) tests -- -- 0.2406 0.9842Figure 1. Global Sovereign CDS Positions in Early 2011.
This figure provides the gross notional amount of outstanding sovereign CDS positions (billion US$) as of February 25, 2011.
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Public Debt/GDP (%) Public Debt/Tax (ratio)Figure 3. Fiscal Space in 2005-07 (continued).  Fiscal balance/GDP divided by tax base (an average Tax/GDP over a period of previous 5 years).
Middle-Income SWEAP OECD
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Fiscal Balance/GDP (%) Fiscal Balance/Tax (ratio)Figure 4. Market Overreaction to Fiscal Pre-Conditions. Based on the out-sample predictions eqs. 6 and 8 in Table 3 (as summarized in Table 4).
The prediction error is the actual CDS divided by the predicted CDS; when >1, there is a signal of under-prediction (i.e. the sovereign default risk is over-priced).
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Fiscal Balance/Tax Base 2005-07
Non-Euro / corr = .5232Figure 5. Fiscal Space and Prediction Error on the Sovereign CDS 5-Year Tenor -- SWEAP Countries and Matched Middle-Income Group.
Based on the in-sample predictions eqs. 2 and 4 in Table 3 (as summarized in Table 4).  The circle size is proportional to 2005-07 public debt/tax base.
The prediction error is the actual CDS divided by the predicted CDS; when >1, there is a signal of under-prediction (i.e. the sovereign default risk is over-priced).
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